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In decision under uncertainty it has been shown that agents distinguish between
prospects for which they have a clear probability assessment or feel competent because of
their own expertise, and prospects for which probabilities are unknown and the agents feel
less competent (Chow and Sarin, 2002; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Heath and Tversky, 1991;
Viscusi and Chesson, 1999; Viscusi and Magat, 1992, Zeckhauser, 2006). The extreme case
of objectively known probabilities (e.g. tails come up in a coin flip) is called risk, and the
extreme case of completely unknown probabilities (e.g. rain tomorrow) is called ambiguity.
Ellsberg (1961) suggested that people often prefer to bet on risky prospects instead of
ambiguous prospects, even if normative theory (Savage, 1954) implies indifference.
Confirming Ellsberg’s conjecture, ambiguity aversion has been found in many empirical
studies, also under market conditions and with monetary incentives (e.g. Halevy, 2007;
Maffioletti and Schmidt, 2005; Sarin and Weber, 1993).
Most experiments on ambiguity are conducted using university students in a
laboratory environment. Few studies have used non-student samples. For example, Viscusi
and Chesson (1999), Maffioletti and Santoni (2005), and Cabantous (2007) show ambiguity
effects for small business owners, union delegates, and insurance managers, suggesting its
importance in real world decisions.
A significant number of decisions under uncertainty is also made by farmers in
developing regions of the world, who, in contrast to the above mentioned groups, live near or
below the poverty line. The objective of this paper is to measure attitudes toward uncertainty
among small scale farmers in one of the poorest regions in the world. Knowledge of attitudes
toward uncertainty is important to understand choices in traditional production activities
involving well known risks, as well as to understand the uptake and adaptation of new
production technologies (e.g. fertilizer) and investments (e.g. water harvesting) that involve
unknown risks, leading to ambiguity. While uncertainty has been identified as an important
determinant of farm technology adoption (Feder, 1980; Feder et al.,1985; Kebede, 1992), the
literature does not systematically differentiate between the effect of risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion.
Although ambiguity attitudes have been widely observed, there is little direct
evidence in the context of development and subsistence farming. Henrich and McElreath
(2002) conducted an experimental study of risk and ambiguity attitude among Chilean
Mapuche small scale farmers and found no evidence for ambiguity aversion. They argued
that ambiguity aversion may be driven by cultural factors, and that it does not generalize to
non-western farming societies. Their explanation is consistent with the finding of a strong2
social component in ambiguity attitude (Curley et al., 1986; Trautmann et al., 2008a):
pursuing ambiguous options for which little information about the risk is available is
perceived as poor decision making and people seem to anticipate this and therefore avoid
ambiguous risks. Such a social stigma for poor information options may not exist in non-
western culture, reducing ambiguity aversion.
Henrich and McElreath’s study shows the problems of generalizing attitudes under
uncertainty from standard experimental participant pools toward culturally different groups
that are of economic interest. Their findings, however, may not generalize toward other
farming societies either. Two points of concern with their results are that (1) the Mapuche
were unusually risk seeking for known probabilities, and (2) that there was no control
experiment among a standard participant pool for the ambiguity experiment. It is conceivable
that the Mapuche held especially optimistic attitudes to the chance events, possible due to
friendly long-term relations with the experimenters, and therefore had optimistic views
concerning the distribution of payoffs in the ambiguous task. Situations under ambiguity are
even more sensitive to framing than situations of known risks (Maffioletti and Schmidt 2005;
Trautmann et al. 2008b). Small differences in the decision tasks compared to studies with
standard student samples at Western universities could therefore provide an obvious
explanation for the observed ambiguity attitudes in the absence of a student control group.
This paper measures attitudes toward uncertainty among small scale farmers in rural
Ethiopia. Our subjects differ from standard subject pools in terms of their occupation, wealth,
and cultural background. The experiment used real monetary incentives with high stakes and
compared the results to data from university students in the Netherlands facing the same
decision tasks. The measure of ambiguity aversion controls for individual differences in risk
attitudes, and we relate both risk and ambiguity attitude to socio-economic variables. The
next section gives a description of the participant pool and introduces the experimental
design. The results are presented in Section 2 and discussed in Section 3. The last section
offers concluding remarks.
1. Participants and experimental design
Participants. The experiment was conducted in the village of Abraha We Atsbaha in
the northern highlands of Ethiopia. The majority of the Ethiopian population resides in the
highlands, where small-scale subsistence agriculture is the main economic activity. Highland
agriculture in Ethiopia is characterized by population pressure, extreme land fragmentation,3
severe soil degradation, and heavy dependence on rainfall. As a result, the overall outcome is
one of the lowest agricultural productivity levels in the world. During the last few decades,
the number of droughts has exacerbated the problem, especially in the northern parts of the
country. Abaraha We Atsbaha is one of many very poor villages in a region where most
people depend on food aid programs to survive between the two annual harvests.
Our sample consisted of 92 adults with little or no formal education, and 30% of those
who participated in our experiment were illiterate. Subjects were randomly selected from a
list of 584 households, with either the male or female household head participating. All
subjects were peasants and mainly growing wheat, maize, barley and teff. Most families also
own some livestock like cattle and sheep. All participants were Christians.
Payoffs. Each participant could win up to 20 Ethiopian birr (ETB). At the time of the
experiment the exchange rate was ETB 9.67 = US$ 1, and the 2007 purchasing power parity
conversion rate was 6.02 for Ethiopia (Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database,
April 2008). Note that in this region, the daily wage for unskilled farm labor varies between
10–15 Birr depending on the season.
Procedure. We elicited each participant’s certainty equivalents for a risky and an
ambiguous prospect using a choice list. The risky prospect allowed the participant to bet on
the color of a ball drawn from a bag with exactly 5 white and 5 yellow balls to win ETB 20 if
the color is guessed correctly. Thus, this prospect offers a 50% chance to win the prize. The
ambiguous prospect allowed participants to bet on the color of a ball drawn from a bag with
10 balls, where each ball can be either white or yellow. The proportion of colors in the
ambiguous bag is unknown. If the color is correctly predicted the participant wins ETB 20.
The two prospects are the risky and ambiguous option in the Ellsberg (1961) two-
color choice task. The ambiguous option is always at least as good as the risky option. If the
participant is indifferent between betting on either color in the ambiguous option, she should
be indifferent between betting on the risky option and betting on the ambiguous option. She
should therefore have identical certainty equivalents for both options. If the participant
believes that there are more white balls than yellow balls in the ambiguous bag, she will bet
on white in the ambiguous prospect and should prefer this prospect to the risky prospect
because it gives her a higher chance to win the prize, given her believes. A similar argument
holds if the participant believes that there are more yellow balls in the ambiguous bag.4
To elicit participants’ certainty equivalents we offer them 20 choices between a sure
payoff and playing the prospect. Choices are arranged in a choice list. The sure payoff
increases from ETB 1 to ETB 20. For very small sure payoffs, most participants will prefer to
play the prospect, for very large sure payoffs most participants will prefer the sure cash. That
is, most participants will switch from sure cash to playing the prospect at some point. We
calculate the certainty equivalent as the midpoint between the lowest sure payoff for which
the participant takes the sure cash and the highest sure payoff for which the participant
prefers to play the prospect (see illustration in the appendix).
Note that this choice list methodology differs from the list employed by Binswanger
(1980), where participants were asked to choose one prospect from a list of prospects that
differed with respect to their expected payoff and variance, and the selected prospect then
served as an index of risk aversion. Our method is closer to Henrich and McElreath’s (2002)
by directly eliciting the certainty equivalent of one prospect, but it avoids the chained
procedure that these authors use. In the chained procedure the decision problems that
participants are offered depend on their previous choices. With the choice list all participants
face the same decision problems. Also, in contrast to chained procedures, the choice list is
incentive compatible.
Participants make choices in one choice list for each prospect. That is, in total they
made 40 choices. After the participants made all choices, one of these choices was randomly
selected for real play for each participant. Depending on his decision in the selected choice
problem, the participant received either the sure cash amount or played the prospect with a
chance to win ETB 20.
Because most of our subjects had no formal education and many were illiterate, the
instructions were given verbally in local language using posters as visual aids. All
probabilities and randomizations were demonstrated using balls and dice, and no explicit
reference to probabilities was given. Visual aids have been shown to improve the
understanding of risks by participants without formal training in probability theory and were
clearly necessary in our sample (Carlsson et al., 2004; Corso et al., 2001). The prospects and
the betting tasks were demonstrated using the risky option by filling the bag with 5 white and
5 yellow balls. A subject chose a color by putting a ball of this color on the table. Next, a ball
was randomly drawn. If the colors matched, the subject was paid ETB 20. The binary
choices between the prospects and the sure amounts of money were presented to the
participant by the experimenter one at a time. The experimenter filled out the choice list
according to the participant’s preference in each choice.5
Control group. As a comparison standard, we use data from an experiment where the
above decision task was conducted with undergraduate university students at a Dutch
university (Trautmann et al., 2008b, experiment 4). The tasks and randomizations were
identical to the Ethiopian sample apart from the following. The prize was €50 for the two
prospects for the student sample, and 2 of 79 students were randomly selected for real play of
their choices. Students received written instructions and filled out the choice lists by
themselves.
2. Experimental results
2.1 Risk and ambiguity attitudes
Risk attitudes. The certainty equivalents for the risky prospect allow us to control for
risk attitude in the measurement of ambiguity below. Risk attitudes are of independent
interest, however, and we report the data here. In this subsection we assume expected utility
with power utility and report constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficients. With the
simple two-outcome gain prospects studied here the results do not change if we assume linear
utility and interpret risk aversion in terms of probability weighting as in rank dependent
utility and prospect theory
5.
The median coefficient of relative risk aversion in the Ethiopian sample is =0.73,
which is significantly larger than the median of =0.34 in the Dutch student sample (Mann-
Whitney U test, z=4.391, p<0.01). Table 1 shows that the percentage of risk neutral and
seeking participants is very similar in both groups, but that among the peasants there are very
few mildly and medium risk averse. In particular, 41 of the 92 participants in Ethiopia
preferred the sure payoff in all choices. The table also includes the distribution of individual
CRRA parameters as estimated by Holt and Laury (2002) for a sample of U.S. students using
real payoffs up to $77 (see Holt and Laury, 2002, Table 3, last column). Their study indicates
more risk aversion than the Dutch study and the distribution is closer to the Ethiopian sample.
However, there are still only about 40% highly risk averse participants in Holt and Laury
(2002) compared to the 60% highly risk averse in our Ethiopian case.
5 Because we have only one indifference point (one certainty equivalent for one risky prospect), we would have
to restrict the analysis to single-parameter probability weighting functions. Econometric estimation of more
flexible weighting functions requires more information and therefore more complex elicitation procedures
(Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Viscusi and Evans, 2006).6
Table 1. Distribution of constant relative risk aversion parameters in Ethiopian peasants





Risk averse Highly risk
averse
0.15 0.15<0.41 0.41<0.68 >0.68
Ethiopian farmers (n=92) 22% 11% 10% 58%
Dutch students (n=79)
Trautmann et al. (2008b)
19% 35% 44% 1%
U.S. students (n=93)
Holt and Laury (2002)
19% 19% 23% 39%
Notes. Numbers are rounded. Identical tasks in Ethiopia and the Netherlands. Holt and Laury
(2002, Table 3, last column) use a slightly different task with all choice options involving
only non-degenerated gambles.
Ambiguity attitudes. In our experiment the individual ambiguity attitudes are
determined by the participant’s certainty equivalents for the risky and the ambiguous
prospect. As a measure of ambiguity aversion, we employ the value
certainty equivalent risky prospect - certainty equivalent ambiguous prospect
certainty equivalent risky prospect + certainty equivalent ambiguous prospect
This measure ranges from –1 (ambiguity loving) to 0 (ambiguity neutrality) to 1 (ambiguity
averse). The larger the difference between the two certainty equivalents, the stronger the
ambiguity attitude, controlling for the absolute level of risk attitude. The normalization
controls for the fact that a difference of ETB 2 weighs more heavily for a subject who is very
risk averse (e.g. certainty equivalent risky prospect of ETB 4) than for a subject who is
relatively risk neutral (e.g. certainty equivalent risky prospect of ETB 9).
Because of the strong risk aversion in the Ethiopian sample we have 41 participants
who revealed the lowest feasible certainty equivalent for the risky prospect. These
participants could not reveal ambiguity aversion by having a lower certainty equivalent for
ambiguous and we exclude them from the analysis. Ambiguity attitudes did not differ
between the Ethiopian peasants and the Dutch students (Mann-Whitney U tests, z=1.535,
p>0.1). In both samples we find clear ambiguity aversion (Wilcoxon tests, ps<0.01). Table 2
shows the distribution of ambiguity attitudes in the Ethiopian and the Dutch samples based on
certainty equivalents, and for three comparison studies. Roca et al. (2006) gave British
university students a simple choice between betting on the color in the risky or the ambiguous
Ellsberg two-color urn as in our experiment. The distribution of ambiguity aversion in their7
basic experiment replicates standard findings in the literature and is similar to our results in
Ethiopia.
6









Ethiopian farmers (n=51) 20% 24% 57% CE, gains,
real incentives
Dutch students (n=79)
Trautmann et al. (2008b)
15% 43% 42% CE, gains,
real incentives
British students (n=72)
Roca et al. (2006)
39% n.a. 61% Choice, gains,
hypothetical
Business owners (n=130)
Chesson and Viscusi (2003)
56% n.a. 44% Choice, losses,
hypothetical
Dutch students (n=39)
Keren and Gerritsen (1999)
3% 46% 51% WTP, gains,
hypothetical
Notes. Numbers rounded. Identical tasks in Ethiopia and the Netherlands. Roca et al., (2006),
Table 1, control; Chesson and Viscusi (2003), Table III, panel B; Keren and Gerritsen (1999),
Table 4, panel b.
The two other studies illustrate the effect of two design features on ambiguity attitude and
show that the induced differences are much stronger than the differences between the
different samples of participants in the first three rows of the table. Chesson and Viscusi
(2003) study ambiguity attitude for loss prospects among business owners in the U.S. Clearly,
there is more ambiguity seeking in their study compared to our study, consistent with
findings for losses in the literature (Cohen et al., 1985; DiMauro and Maffioletti, 1996; Ho et
al., 2002; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1985; Kahn and Sarin, 1988). Keren and Gerritsen (1999)
elicited Dutch university students’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the risky and the ambiguous
Ellsberg two-color urn. They find clear ambiguity aversion and almost none of the subjects
were willing to pay more for the ambiguous option.
7
6 Note that 8 (20%) of the 41 subjects with extreme risk aversion that we excluded were ambiguity seeking,
while the remaining subjects were ambiguity neutral or averse. This is similar to the distribution for the
unconstrained subjects in Table 2.
7 Trautmann et al. (2008b) illustrate this strong effect of WTP elicitation on ambiguity attitudes and provide a
model that suggests that WTP overestimates ambiguity aversion.8
2.2 Effects of demographic variables
Before the experiment was conducted, the Ethiopian participants were interviewed on a
number of socio-economic background variables beyond the normally observed age and
gender for student samples. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Socio-Economic background variables for the Ethiopian sample (n=92).
Mean Min Max
Personal
Age in years 43 22 80
Female 51% 0 1
Poor health (yes=1) 28% 0 1
Family
Married (yes=1) 81% 0 1
Household size (not including respondent) 4.59 0 11
Number of dependent children 2.58 0 6
Economic
Land size (in timads; 1 hectare  4 timads) 1.84 1 4
Monthly consumption per household (ETB) 578 50 3000
We regress the risk and ambiguity attitudes on this set of explanatory variables. For
risk attitude we avoid dependence on expected utility assumptions by using the pure
certainty multiplied by –1 as an index or risk aversion. In the regressions we control for
censoring of our measures because a sizable fraction of participants revealed the lowest
possible certainty equivalent. Thus, we use a Tobit model for our analysis of risk attitude. We
also test whether socio-economic variables explain the presence of extreme risk attitudes by
including a Probit regression for dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the certainty
equivalent is censored at 1, and 0 otherwise. For ambiguity attitude we apply OLS
regressions for the measure described in section 2.1 because there is no censoring of
ambiguity attitude. Regression results are shown in Table 4. Positive parameter values in the
regressions imply increasing risk or ambiguity aversion, or increasing likelihood to show
extreme level of risk aversion respectively. Marginal effects are reported for the probit
regression.9


































































# observations 84 84 45
Notes. **, * denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, standard errors in parenthesis
(robust standard errors for OLS). Marginal effects are reported for the Probit regression.
The regression results show that poor health is related both to stronger risk aversion
and stronger ambiguity aversion. In particular, for risk, the subjects with poor health status
demonstrate extreme risk aversion. Apart from health effects, we find that household size
increases risk aversion, while being married reduces ambiguity aversion. No other socio-
economic variables had an influence on uncertainty attitudes in our data.
To control for the possibility of nonlinear effects of the economic variables land and
consumption we plotted uncertainty attitudes against these variables. If anything, for risk
aversion these plots suggested an U-shaped relation for land size and a logarithmic shape for
consumption. We included the nonlinear transformations in another set of regressions. The
nonlinear effects were not significant and did not affect the above shown results.10
3. Discussion
Cross sample comparison. There has been much interest in cross cultural differences
in attitudes towards uncertainty, and numerous studies have measured attitudes toward
prospects with objectively known payoff distributions in developing countries and small scale
societies (Binswanger, 1980; Bohnet et al., 2008; Kuznar, 2001; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2007;
Henrich and McElreath; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Elamin and Rogers, 1992; Weber and
Hsee, 1998). Most of these studies found a similar degree of risk aversion as those commonly
found in student samples from developed countries. Henrich and McElreath (2002) showed
that there can be significant differences between culturally diverse peasant societies,
however.
8 These authors also suggested the importance of cross cultural comparison of
attitudes toward ambiguous prospects, when probabilities are unknown. In the real world
ambiguity is ubiquitous, and farmers’ preferences between traditional uncertain technologies
with well-known payoff distributions and new technologies and crops with unknown risks are
relevant to innovation and development.
We study risk and ambiguity attitude experimentally in a sample of poor Ethiopian
peasants. The experiment uses real incentives and concrete visual representations of prospects
in terms of differently colored balls in urns, without reference to probabilities. We compare
the Ethiopian data to data from an experiment among Western university students using
exactly the same decision task. Holding design features constant between groups is necessary
to draw conclusions regarding cross cultural differences, especially when studying potentially
volatile ambiguity attitudes (Bohnet et al., 2008; Kocher et al., 2008; Roth et al., 1991;
Herrmann et al., 2008).
We find both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion for Ethiopian peasants. Risk
aversion is stronger for the peasants than for the comparison student samples, and this effects
is driven by extreme risk attitudes among the peasants. Comparing the distribution of risk
attitudes with other findings from standard Western student populations shows, however, that
variation is well within the range of the variation that would be expected across different
experiments. In any case, the data support the view that strong risk aversion predominates
among the farmers.
Ambiguity aversion did not differ between Ethiopian peasants and Dutch university
students, and both groups show ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity attitudes in the samples
8 Similarly, Bohnet et al. (2008) found evidence for social risk aversion (betrayal aversion) in the six countries
contained in their study, but they also found clear differences in the strength of the aversion across these
countries.11
considered in our study are also comparable to those reported in the literature for gains and
choice elicitation. Contrasting our results with the results in the literature that use different
framing (losses) or a different elicitation method (WTP) shows that slight differences in the
experimental design can strongly affect ambiguity attitudes. This illustrates the importance of
keeping design features constant when comparing ambiguity attitudes across different
participant populations. Otherwise the effects of the elicitation method may wrongly be
interpreted as sample differences in attitudes, possibly leading to wrong policy.
Effects of socio-economic variables. The finding of relatively high risk aversion for
Ethiopian peasants compared to Western university students suggests a possible link between
poverty and risk aversion. The explanation is not supported by the analysis of socio-economic
background data, however. Neither land size (wealth) nor consumption (income) had any
significant influence on risk attitudes. The absence of wealth effects on risk attitude is
consistent with the results in Binswanger (1980), Henrich and McElreath (2002), and Booij
and van de Kuilen (2009). Positive effects of wealth and income on risk tolerance have been
found in Donkers et al. (2001) and Dohmen et al. (2005), however, and Barsky et al. (1997)
find a U-shaped effect of wealth and income with first decreasing and then increasing risk
tolerance. We tested for such U-shape relationship in our data set but did not find evidence
for it.
Unlike many studies, we find no gender effect for risk attitude (Borghans et al., 2009;
Donkers et al. 2001; Schubert et al., 1999). There is a clear effect of health status, with
subjects in poor health being more risk averse. In particular, subjects in poor health show
extreme risk aversion and therefore add to the observed differences with student samples. A
similar effect is observed for household size, with subjects responsible for larger households
being more risk averse.
There is little evidence yet on the effect of socio-economic variables on ambiguity
attitude. Regressions analysis of our socio-economic data shows that, similar to the effect on
risk attitude, poor health increases ambiguity aversion. Marriage reduces ambiguity aversion
in our sample. No other effects are found. Consistent with findings in Borghans et al. (2009),
there is no clear gender effect for ambiguity.
Poor health and uncertainty attitude. The lack of strong socio-economic effects on
risk and ambiguity attitudes is largely consistent with the literature. Our finding of a strong
effect of health is interesting in this respect. Most direct measurements of attitudes toward12
uncertainty about monetary payoffs in the economics literature do not account for health
states or use subject pools with little variation in health status. Viscusi and Evans (1990)
estimate utility functions for income explicitly accounting for health state, using the state
dependent utility framework proposed by Zeckhauser (1970). They found reduced marginal
utility of income in poor health states compared to full health. Our result of increased risk
aversion under poor health can be explained within this framework by relatively flat utility
functions under impaired health compared to good health. Our finding for increased
ambiguity aversion for poor health cannot easily be explained within this state dependent
utility framework, however.
The result is also consistent with temperance (Eeckhoudt et al., 1995; Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger, 2006): temperate decision makers dislike to assume more (independent) risks in
situations in which they are already confronted with a risk. If poor health indicates situations
of high health background risk, participants will be less willing to take an additional financial
risk than in situations of low health risk, i.e., in good health. Again, the effects of poor health
on ambiguity aversion do not simply follow from this framework either. The ambiguity effect
would suggest that the precautionary motive of temperance becomes stronger in the case of
risks for which the decision maker feels less competent.
Finally, note that the relatively high degree of risk aversion among the farmers, and
especially the occurrence of extreme attitudes, might be driven by negative past experiences.
Compared to decision makers in Western societies, for our Ethiopian small scale farmers
poor outcomes resulting from risky decisions are arguably more severe. A poor harvest after
switching to a promising new crop that turned out unsuitable for the local soils can threaten
the existence of the family, in particular for those household heads in poor health.
4. Conclusion
Attitudes toward uncertainty are important factors in the analysis of economic problems and
policy in developing countries. Risk-sharing, crop selection, and precautionary saving
influence welfare in risky agricultural environments and are influenced by economic actors’
attitudes toward risk (Dercon 1996; Jalan and Ravallion 2001; Kochar, 1999; Pan, 2008;
Udry, 1994). Henrich and McElreath (2002) argue that apart from risk attitude also
ambiguity attitude, that is, preferences toward prospects with unknown payoff distributions,13
may be important to development. Adoption of new technology and crops which involve
unknown risks may depend more on ambiguity than on pure risk attitude.
Ambiguity aversion has been widely observed among Western university student
samples, and theoretical models of ambiguity aversion have been proposed as explanations
for market phenomena in developed economies (e.g. Mukerji and Tallon, 2001; Easley and
O’Hara, 2008; Viscusi and Magat, 1992; Zeckhauser, 2006). In contrast to most findings in
the literature, Henrich and McElreath (2002) reported positive attitudes toward ambiguity in
their experiments with Chilean Mapuche peasants. They also found strong risk seeking for
prospects with known probabilities. These authors argue that diverse cultural factors drive
uncertainty attitudes and that ambiguity aversion might be specific to western student
populations. In contrast, we find strong ambiguity and risk aversion in experimental decision
tasks for our sample of Ethiopian peasants. Although consistent with the view that
uncertainty attitudes depend on cultural factors, these results clearly show that ambiguity
aversion is also observed in populations deviating on various dimensions from standard
university student populations. This suggests that both risk and ambiguity attitude are
important for economic decisions in poor agricultural societies, and that both attitudes should
be considered in policies regarding the situation of the poor.14
Appendix
A Choice list elicitation of certainty equivalents
The choices were presented to the participants in increasing order of the sure amounts. In the
example the certainty equivalent is calculated as the midpoint between the largest sure
amount for which the participant chooses to play the gamble, and the smallest sure amount
for which the participants chooses to take the sure cash. That is, the certainty equivalent of
the risky prospect is ETB 6.5:
[1] Bet on a draw from white bag  O Receive 1 Birr for sure
[2] Bet on a draw from white bag  O Receive 2 Birr for sure
[3] Bet on a draw from white bag  O Receive 3 Birr for sure
[4] Bet on a draw from white bag  O Receive 4 Birr for sure
[5] Bet on a draw from white bag  O Receive 5 Birr for sure
[6] Bet on a draw from white bag  O Receive 6 Birr for sure
[7] Bet on a draw from white bag O  Receive 7 Birr for sure
[8] Bet on a draw from white bag O  Receive 8 Birr for sure
[9] Bet on a draw from white bag O  Receive 9 Birr for sure
…
[19] Bet on a draw from white bag O  Receive 19 Birr for sure
[20] Bet on a draw from white bag O  Receive 20 Birr for sure
Participants were presented one choice list for each prospect (risky and ambiguous). One of
the choices was randomly selected for payment and played according to the participant’s
choice.
B Instructions for Ethiopian Participants
Good morning (Good afternoon)! My name is X. I am here to play a game with you.
Before we begin, I will explain the rules of the game. This is an individual exercise, so please
do not talk. Please hold your questions until I have finished the explanations. In this game,
you can make money. The money will be paid tomorrow by your teacher. How much money
you make, depends to large extent on your decisions. Therefore, it is important that you
understand the rules of the game. Please listen carefully.15
In the first part of the game, you can choose between drawing a ball from the black
bag (show the bag) and have a chance to win 20 birr, or just receive a certain amount of
money.
The drawing from the black bag will be conducted in the following way. We will fill
the bag with 5 yellow and 5 white balls. (Fill the bag with balls and count aloud.) When it is
my turn to draw a ball from the bag, I will draw one ball without looking. Before I draw a
ball, I will pick a color—let us say white. If I pick a white ball from the bag, I will place a
white ball on the desk. (Put a white ball on the desk.) If I draw a second white ball later, I
will get 20 birr. If the ball is yellow, I will not get anything. (Draw a ball and announce the
color.)
You will soon get an answer sheet, which looks like the one on the wall. When you
play the game, I would like you, for each choice, to decide if you would like to draw a ball
from the black bag (show the bag) or if you just want a certain amount of money. Of all the
choices you make, only one of them will be played for real. Which choice will be played for
real will be randomly determined by rolling a dice. For example, I will decide if I prefer to
draw a ball from the black bag (show the bag) and have the possibility to win 20 birr or
receive 1 birr for sure. If I prefer to draw from the bag (rather than getting 1 birr for sure),
then I check this box on the left (point on the left box); otherwise, I check this box on the
right (point at the right box).
In next choice, I also decide if I would like to draw a ball from the black bag or get a
certain amount of money for sure. But, this time I will receive 2 birr for sure. As you can see,
the amount in birr increases in the right column. (Point at the right column.) As long as I
want to draw a ball from the black bag instead of getting a certain amount of money for sure,
I check the left box (point at the left box). Assume that I prefer to draw a ball from the black
bag, then I can check here (point at the left boxes in the second to last choice). But, in the last
choice, I shall always check the right box (point) because it must be better to for sure get 20
birr than draw a ball from the black bag which might give me 20 birr.
Assume that I do not want to draw from the black bag at all, then in the first choice I
choose to get the money for sure and continue with that for all choices (point at the right
column). But, most likely, I will begin by choosing to draw from the black bag until the
choice situation comes when I prefer to choose the for sure amount (show with a sweeping
motion). When I have chosen the for sure amount, then I continue with that for the rest of the
choice situations. If I prefer 1 birr for sure in the first choice situation, rather than drawing a
ball from the black bag, then it is clear that in next choice situation, I will prefer 2 birr for
sure over drawing a ball from the black bag.
Have everyone understood the rules of the game? (Leave time for questions.)16
The second part of our game is similar to the first, but there is one important
difference: the black bag is now replaced by the white bag. (Show the bag.) Now you will
decide if you would like to draw a ball from the white bag and have a chance to win 20 birr
or if you would like to get a certain amount of money for sure.
The draw from the white bag is conducted in the following way. We have filled the
white bag with white and yellow 10 balls. However, how many of there exist of each color is
secret. Before I draw a ball, I will pick a color, exactly as before, and put the ball with the
selected color on the desk. When it is my turn to draw a ball from the bag, I will draw one
ball without looking. The only thing that differs the first part is that the black bag contains 5
white and 5 yellow balls (show the bag) while the white bag contains 10 balls, but the number
of balls of each color is secret.
You will all get a second answer sheet, which looks like the poster on the wall. When
you play the game, I would like you to decide, for each choice, if you want to draw a ball
from the white bag or if you for sure would like a certain amount of money.
Have everyone understood the rules of the game? (Leave time for questions.)
Now I will explain how you will get your money. When everybody has made all their
20 choices (point at all choices), each of you will roll a 6-edged dice to decide whether the
answer sheet with the black or white bag will be used. If the dice shows the numbers 1, 2, or
3, then the answer sheet with the black bag will be used. If the dice shows the numbers 4, 5,
or 6, then the white bag will be used (show the dice). Then, you will roll a 20-edged dice to
decide which of the 20 alternatives will be played (show the dice). The number shown will be
the choice situation played for real.
First, I will throw the 6-edged dice (throw the dice). If I roll number 3, the answer
sheet with the black bag is in play (point at poster with a black bag). Then, I will roll the 20-
edged dice to decide which choice situation on the answer sheet will played for real (throw
the dice). If I roll number 5, the choice situation 5 in the black bag will be played for real
(point at poster with a black bag and at choice situation 5). Now comes the most important
part: if, in choice situation 5, I have chosen to draw from the black bag, then I must draw a
ball from the black bag. If I guessed the correct color, I will win 20 birr, otherwise I will get
nothing. Remember that the black bag contains 5 white and 5 yellow balls. If I have chosen to
get a certain amount of money for sure, I will get 5 birr. If, for example, I roll number 5 when
I roll the 6-edged dice, then the white bag is the valid one. If I then roll the 20-edged dice and
get number 11, choice situation 11 will be played (point at white bag and choice situation 11
on the poster). If I then draw a ball with the same color as I have guessed, I win 20 birr;
otherwise I will get nothing. Remember that the white bag contains 10 balls, but you do not
know how many balls are white and yellow. If I have chosen to get a certain amount of
money for sure, I will get 11 birr.17
When you roll the two dice, you can get either of the 2 bags and any of the 20 choice
situations. Therefore, you should carefully think about each choice: whether you would like
to draw a ball from the bag or for sure get a certain amount of money.
Have everyone understood the rules of the game? (Leave time for questions.)
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